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Individual differences in receptivity to scientific bullshit
Anthony Evans∗ Willem Sleegers† Žan Mlakar‡
Abstract
Pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity is the tendency to perceive meaning in important-sounding, nonsense statements. To
understand how bullshit receptivity differs across domains, we develop a scale to measure scientific bullshit receptivity —
the tendency to perceive truthfulness in nonsensical scientific statements. Across three studies (total N = 1,948), scientific
bullshit receptivity was positively correlated with pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity. Both types of bullshit receptivity were
positively correlated with belief in science, conservative political beliefs, and faith in intuition. However, compared to pseudo-
profound bullshit receptivity, scientific bullshit receptivity was more strongly correlated with belief in science, and less strongly
correlated with conservative political beliefs and faith in intuition. Finally, scientific literacy moderated the relationship the
two types of bullshit receptivity; the correlation between the two types of receptivity was weaker for individuals scoring high
in scientific literacy.
Keywords: bullshit receptivity, belief in science, motivated reasoning, false beliefs
1 Introduction
Disinformation can negatively affect individual health and
well-being (Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz
& Woloshin, 2007), as well as the functioning of society
at large (Sunstein, 2018). To understand how and why
people are influenced by false information, psychologists
have begun to investigate the processes underlying bullshit
receptivity, the tendency to believe in important-sounding
nonsense statements that are ultimately indifferent to the
truth (Frankfurt, 2005). In particular, recent studies have
focused on identifying correlates of the willingness to ac-
cept pseudo-profound bullshit (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr,
Koehler & Fugelsang, 2015).
We extend prior research by introducing a measure of
receptivity to scientific bullshit. People generally trust in
scientists and the institution of science (Pew, 2019). Given
the strong public trust in science, scientific language can be
used as a tool to promote consumer products (Fowler, Carl-
son & Chaudhuri, 2019), health behaviors (Larsen et al.,
2019), and public policies (Sánchez & Parrott, 2017). Al-
though well-intentioned agents may use scientific language
to provide citizens with valid information and advice, scien-
tific jargon can also be used as a tool to obfuscate or mislead
the public (Goldacre, 2010). In the present research, we
are interested in individual differences in susceptibility to
nonsensical scientific claims.
Copyright: © 2020. The authors license this article under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
∗Department of Social Psychology, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153,
5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. Email: tony.m.evans@gmail.com.
ORCID 0000–0003-3345-5282.
†Tilburg University, 0000–0001-9058-3817.
‡University of Groningen, 0000–0003-3399-9220.
We developed a scale to measure individual differences in
the tendency to perceive truthfulness in nonsensical scien-
tific statements (Example: “There are no transverse waves
when the total magnetic sublimation through a stiff photon is
equal to its scattered matrix”). First, we investigate whether
receptivity to scientific bullshit is correlated with receptiv-
ity to pseudo-profound bullshit. Then, we ask whether the
correlates of bullshit receptivity are consistent (or differ-
ent) across content domains. More specifically, we compare
how the two types of bullshit are correlated with individ-
ual differences in belief in science, political ideology, and
cognitive style. We also ask to what extent these correla-
tions are influenced by acquiescence bias (the tendency to
agree with statements, regardless of content), and compare
the correlates of receptivity versus sensitivity to scientific
bullshit (i.e., the ability to distinguish between factual and
bullshit scientific statements). Finally, we examine how rel-
evant domain-expertise (i.e., scientific literacy) moderates
the correlation between the two types of bullshit receptivity.
1.1 Pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity
Bullshit is communication that is meant to seem meaningful
and impressive (Frankfurt, 2005), but, at the same time, is
“unclarifiably unclarifiable” (Cohen, 2002). In other words,
a bullshit statement is inherently unclear, and bullshit state-
ments cannot be made clear to those who do not find initial
meaning in them (Cohen, 2002). Following this definition,
Pennycook et al. (2015) introduced a scale to measure in-
dividual differences in receptivity to pseudo-profound bull-
shit. In this scale, participants rate the profundity of syn-
tactically coherent statements that were constructed without
concern for the truth. The statements were constructed using
phrase generators that randomly combined sets of new age,
401
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profound-sounding terms (Example: “We are in the midst of
a self-aware blossoming of being that will align us with the
nexus itself”).
What type of person is receptive to pseudo-profound bull-
shit? Pennycook et al. (2015) found that individuals re-
ceptive to bullshit are also more likely to rely on intuitive
(vs. reflective) cognitive processes; have weaker cognitive
abilities (i.e., lower scores in verbal intelligence, fluid intel-
ligence, and numeracy), and are more likely to believe in
religion and the supernatural. Generally, those who believe
in pseudo-profound bullshit are either relatively unwilling or
unable to engage in rational thought. Furthermore, pseudo-
profound bullshit receptivity may have important behavioral
consequences, as those who believe in pseudo-profound bull-
shit are more susceptible to fake news (Pennycook & Rand,
2017). Pseudo-profound bullshit can also be strategically
used to increase the attractiveness of consumer goods, such
as works of modern art. Paintings with pseudo-profound
titles are seen as higher-quality than paintings with mundane
titles (Turpin et al., 2019).
Existing research has focused primarily on pseudo-
profound bullshit, statements that are superficially related
to the fundamental nature of the universe or existence. How-
ever, bullshit can also be employed in mundane contexts. For
example, bullshit arguments can appear in modern work-
places (Beckwith, 2006), political discussions (Hopkin &
Rosamond, 2018), and even in (seemingly) evidence-based
scientific reports (Bauer, 2008). It is important to consider
how bullshit receptivity functions across domains: Are some
people generally accepting of bullshit statements, regardless
of content? Or are the correlates of bullshit sensitivity differ-
ent across domains? For example, individuals with spiritual
proclivities may be more likely to accept pseudo-profound
(but not political) bullshit.
A recent study by Čavojová, Brezina and Jurkovič (2020)
points to the idea that receptivity to bullshit may be con-
sistent across content domains. Čavojová et al. (2020) de-
veloped a scale to measure general receptivity to bullshit
consisting of statements related to general concepts in areas
such as health, relationships, economics, and politics. There
was a strong positive correlation (r ∼ .60) between pseudo-
profound bullshit receptivity and general bullshit receptiv-
ity, and both types of bullshit receptivity were positively
correlated with conspiracy beliefs, pseudoscientific beliefs,
paranormal beliefs, and individual differences in cognitive
style (e.g., greater reliance on intuitive thinking and greater
ontological confusion). In the present research, we add to
the literature by examining bullshit receptivity in the context
of science.
1.2 Scientific bullshit receptivity
We define scientific bullshit as a form of communication
that relies on obtuse scientific jargon to convey a false sense
of importance or significance. As with the case of pseudo-
profound bullshit, scientific bullshit is syntactically coherent,
but impossible to verify as either true or false. Scientific
bullshit, however, is constructed using scientific (rather than
New Age) terminology; and the aim of scientific bullshit is
to sound true, not profound.
There is good reason to anticipate that people are sus-
ceptible to scientific bullshit: Although people are reluctant
to trust in scientific findings that directly conflict with their
personal interests and beliefs (Kahan et al., 2012), the pub-
lic maintains a generally positive view of scientists and the
broader institution of science (Pew, 2019). For example,
U.S. Americans consider scientists to be more trustworthy
than business leaders, religious leaders, the news media,
and elected officials (Funk, Hefferon, Kennedy & Johnson,
2019). The public’s general trust in science (and scien-
tists) may also mean that people are vulnerable to malevolent
agents who make use of the superficial trappings of science
(e.g., those who use irrelevant or made-up scientific jargon)
to manipulate the public.
Recent studies support the idea that people trust scien-
tific terminology even when it is irrelevant or unnecessary:
Laypeople are more likely to accept scientific explanations
that are accompanied with irrelevant neuroscientific jargon
(Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, Rawson & Gray, 2008; Weis-
berg, Taylor & Hopkins, 2015); in particular, scientific jargon
makes non-experts more willing to accept low-quality sci-
entific arguments. Similarly, experienced readers will judge
scientific abstracts as higher quality when they include ir-
relevant mathematical equations (Eriksson, 2012). These
studies illustrate that scientific language can be used to bull-
shit readers. Here, we introduce a measure of the individual
tendency to accept nonsense scientific statements (scientific
bullshit), and ask how receptivity to scientific bullshit is
related to pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity.
1.2.1 Scientific bullshit and pseudo-profound bullshit
Our first question is whether receptivity to scientific bullshit
is correlated (either positively or negatively) with receptiv-
ity to pseudo-profound bullshit. The answer to this ques-
tion depends on the extent to which bullshit receptivity is a
domain-general (vs. domain-specific) individual difference.
Previous work has found that individual differences in judg-
ment and decision making vary substantially across content
domains (Blais & Weber, 2006; Duckworth & Kern, 2011).
For example, financial risk-taking is only weakly correlated
with risk-taking decisions related to health and social re-
lationships. If this is the case for bullshit receptivity, then
there should be a weak (or perhaps even negative) correlation
between receptivity to scientific bullshit and receptivity to
scientific bullshit. On the other hand, if bullshit receptivity
is consistent across domains (Čavojová et al., 2020) and re-
lated to general dispositions, such as the general preference to
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rely on intuitive processes, then there may be strong positive
correlations between different forms of bullshit receptivity.1
1.2.2 The correlates of scientific bullshit receptivity
Our second goal is to examine correlates of scientific bullshit
receptivity, and to ask whether these variables are differently
correlated with scientific (vs. pseudo-profound) bullshit re-
ceptivity. We focus on three areas relevant to scientific bull-
shit: belief in science (Farias, Newheiser, Kahane & de
Toledo, 2013), political ideology (Sterling, Jost & Penny-
cook, 2016), and cognitive style (Pennycook et al., 2015).
Belief in science. Individuals differ in the extent to which
they believe in the value of science and its superiority as
a source of knowledge (Farias et al., 2013). Those who
believe in the institution of science may also be more likely
to believe in scientific bullshit. In other words, those who
have extremely high levels of trust in the discipline of science
may be more likely to take any scientific statement at face
value, without reading it carefully to assess its veracity, as
individuals tend to process information less carefully when
they are in trusting (vs. skeptical) mindsets (Mayo, 2015). At
the same time, those with strong beliefs in science may also
be less likely to trust in pseudo-profound bullshit. Belief in
science is negatively correlated with religiosity and spiritual
beliefs (Farias et al., 2013), and people may implicitly believe
that science and religion exist in opposition to one another
(Preston & Epley, 2009).
Political ideology. Recently, Sterling et al. (2016) found
that conservative political beliefs are positively correlated
with receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit. Similarly,
Pfattheicher and Schindler (2016) found that candidate pref-
erences in the 2016 U.S. American presidential election were
correlated with bullshit receptivity: supporters of Donald
Trump, Ted Cruz, and Marco Rubio (the top three Republican
candidates when the study was conducted) were more recep-
tive to pseudo-profound bullshit than supporters of Hillary
Clinton and Martin O’Malley (the top two Democratic can-
didates at the time). Replicating these results in a Swedish
sample, Nilsson, Erlandsson and Västfjäll (2019) found that
bullshit receptivity was consistently correlated with social
(vs. economic) conservatism, even when statistically control-
ling for demographics and individual differences in cognitive
style (e.g., numeracy and cognitive reflection).
We ask whether conservative political beliefs are also cor-
related with receptivity to scientific bullshit. If the tendency
to accept bullshit statements is independent of context, then
it is likely that conservatives will also endorse bullshit sci-
entific statements. At the same time, other work has found
1Before running our first study, we hypothesized a priori that there would
be a null or negative correlation between the two types of bullshit receptivity.
To preview our results: there was instead a strong positive relationship.
that conservatives are generally less trusting of science than
liberals (Gauchat, 2012), though both groups are generally
distrustful of dissonant or personally threatening scientific
findings (Kahan et al., 2012). If conservatives are indeed
less trusting of science, then they may also be more likely
to apply a skeptical eye towards scientific bullshit (Mayo,
2019). If this is the case, then conservatism should be neg-
atively correlated with scientific bullshit receptivity, or at
least less strongly correlated with scientific bullshit recep-
tivity (compared to the correlation between conservatism
and pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity).
Cognitive style. Third, we examine the relationship be-
tween scientific bullshit receptivity and individual differ-
ences in cognitive style, the extent to which individuals pre-
fer to rely on intuitive versus reflective thinking (Cacioppo
& Petty, 1982; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj & Heier, 1996).
Individuals who prefer an intuitive cognitive style are also
more likely to accept pseudo-profound bullshit (Pennycook
et al., 2015; Pennycook & Rand, 2017), yet it remains unclear
if intuitive thinking will also be associated with receptivity
to scientific bullshit. Arguably, science is associated with
rational, deliberate reasoning (Pinker, 2018). Hence, those
who prefer to rely on intuition may be less inclined to accept
scientific bullshit statements.
1.2.3 Scientific literacy and scientific bullshit
Our third area of investigation deals with how knowledge of
science influences the relationship between scientific bull-
shit receptivity and pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity.
Prior work has highlighted that laypersons and those who
lack knowledge of science may be particularly susceptible
to the influence of irrelevant scientific jargon (Weisberg et
al., 2008). Non-experts are particularly susceptible to bad
scientific arguments. Hence, individuals who have explicit
knowledge of science may be better able to recognize sci-
entific bullshit when they see it, whereas those with little
scientific background may realize they lack the expertise to
judge the legitimacy of scientific statements. In other words,
scientific literacy may moderate the relationship between
the two types of bullshit receptivity, with highly literate in-
dividuals being better able to differentiate between scientific
bullshit and pseudo-profound bullshit.
1.3 Overview of studies
We investigate three overarching questions related to indi-
vidual differences in scientific bullshit receptivity: First,
we examine the correlation between receptivity to pseudo-
profound bullshit and receptivity to scientific bullshit. Sec-
ond, we investigate whether the two types of bullshit re-
ceptivity are differently correlated with belief in science,
political ideology, and cognitive style. We will ask whether
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Table 1: Participant demographics.
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Total
Sample size 365 543 1,040 1,948
Gender
Men 229 284 559 1,072
Women 133 255 472 860
NA or other 3 4 9 16











53 83 118 253
Part of college or a
full college degree
270 40 699 1,372
Some or all of a
graduate degree
40 57 223 320
N/A 2 1 0 3
scientific bullshit receptivity is correlated with these vari-
ables, and whether the two types of bullshit receptivity are
differently correlated with them. For example, we will ask
if the correlation between belief in science and scientific
bullshit receptivity is stronger than the correlation between
belief in science and pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity.
While investigating these first two questions, we will ex-
amine how controlling for acquiescence bias – the tendency
to agree with scale items, regardless of the specific item con-
tent – influences the above correlations (Rammstedt, Kemper
& Borg, 2013). Additionally, we will conduct exploratory
analyses to compare the correlates of receptivity to scientific
bullshit and sensitivity to scientific bullshit: the ability to
differentiate between factual versus bullshit scientific state-
ments. Previous studies on pseudo-profound bullshit recep-
tivity found that receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit is
correlated with intuitive thinking and reliance on heuristics
and biases, whereas sensitivity to pseudo-profound bullshit
is correlated with analytical thinking and rational decision
making (Pennycook et al., 2015).
Finally, we examine whether scientific literacy (e.g., gen-
eral scientific knowledge) moderates the relationship be-
tween the two types of bullshit receptivity. We ask whether
scientific literacy weakens the correlation between pseudo-
profound bullshit receptivity and scientific bullshit receptiv-
ity. To answer these questions, we conduct analyses using
aggregated data from three studies.
2 Methods
Each of our three studies was pre-registered at AsPre-
dicted: Study 1: http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=44si22;
Study 2: http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=73ev8s; Study
3: https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=dd4up6.
2.1 Participants
Across three studies, we recruited 2,039 U.S. American par-
ticipants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (Studies 1 and 2)
and Prolific Academic (Study 3).2 Participants were paid at
a rate of approximately $0.15 per minute ($1.20 in Study 1,
$2.00 in Study 2, and £1.60 in Study 3). Study 1 was con-
ducted in May 2017; Study 2 was conducted in July 2017;
and Study 3 was conducted in November 2018. We excluded
91 participants (4.46%) from the analysis because they failed
to complete one or more of the measures, which left us with
a final N = 1,948. Demographics of the included participants
are reported in Table 1.
The sample sizes for each study were based on power anal-
yses conducted using GPower (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner &
Lang, 2009). In Study 1, the planned sample size was based
on a power analysis with U = .05, V = .20 (80% statistical
power), and r = .15: minimum N = 343. In Study 2, the
planned sample size was based on U = .05, V = .20 and r =
.12: minimum N = 540. In Study 3, the sample size was
based on U = .05, V = .1 and r = .10, minimum N = 1,043.
2.2 Materials and procedure
2.2.1 Measures
Participants in all three studies completed the Pseudo-
Profound Bullshit Receptivity Scale (Pennycook et al.,
2015); the Scientific Bullshit Receptivity Scale (which we
describe in the following section); the Belief in Science Scale
(Farias et al., 2013) and the Social and Economic Conser-
vatism Scale (Everett, 2013).
There were also unique measures included in each study:
In Study 1, participants completed an additional measure of
ideology, the Free Market Belief Scale (Heath & Gifford,
2006). In study 2, participants completed two measures of
cognitive style, the Faith in Intuition Scale (Epstein et al.,
1996) and the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty &
Feng Kao, 1984), as well as a measure of acquiescence bias
(Rammstedt et al., 2013). In Study 3, participants completed
the Science Literacy Scale (Kahan et al., 2012).
Pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity. Receptiv-
ity to pseudo-profound bullshit was measured using
the scale introduced in Pennycook et al. (2015).
2We restricted each study to only U.S. American participants and pro-
hibited repeat participants in the two MTurk studies.
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This scale consists of 20 statements constructed
with generators (http://wisdomofchopra.com and
http://sebpearce.com/bullshit) that randomly combine
pre-entered words into syntactically correct sentences that
tend to sound profound, but inherently carry no meaning
(i.e., “Hidden meaning transforms unparalleled abstract
beauty”). Participants rated these statements on a 5-point
profundity scale (1 = not at all profound; 5 = very profound),
Cronbach’s U = .94.
Scientific bullshit receptivity. We developed a new scale
to measure receptivity to bullshit scientific statements. Ten-
items (bullshit statements) were created by taking existing
physical laws and changing their central words with ran-
domly selected words from a physics glossary. These items
sounded elaborate and complex, but had no actual scientific
truth (Example: “There are no transverse waves when the to-
tal magnetic sublimation through a stiff photon is equal to its
scattered matrix”). The ten remaining items (real scientific
statements) were based on actual physical laws (Example: “A
cyclic transformation whose only final result is to transform
heat extracted from a source which is at the same tempera-
ture throughout into work is impossible”). Note that these
ten factual statements were excluded from the third study.
The complete set of items can be found in the Appendix.
Participants indicated the extent to which they believed
each item to reflect the truth. They indicated their answers
on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all truthful; 5 = very
truthful). Our measure of bullshit receptivity was the average
response to the ten bullshit statements, U = .83.
Content validation. We collected data to validate the
content of our scientific bullshit statements. Participants (N
= 200 U.S. Americans recruited from Prolific Academic)
were presented with ten pseudo-profound bullshit state-
ments and ten scientific bullshit statements. The pseudo-
profound statements consisted of the first ten items of the
bullshit receptivity measure introduced by Pennycook et
al. (2015). Participants were asked to rate how scientific-
sounding (sounding as if it is related to science) and how
profound-sounding (sounding as if it is related to related to
the meaning or nature of existence) each statement was.3
The twenty statements were rated on a scale from 1 (Not
at all scientific- / profound-sounding) to 5 (Very scientific-
/ profound-sounding), and were presented in a randomized
order. We compared ratings using multilevel models with
random-intercepts estimated for each participant and each
statement. Scientific statements were seen as more scientific-
sounding (M = 4.59, SD = 0.73) than pseudo-profound state-
ments (M = 2.15, SD = 1.18), b = 2.43, SE = 0.17, p <
3Note that we asked participants to rate how the statements sounded, not
whether the statements were actually scientific or profound.
.001; and scientific statements were seen as less profound-
sounding (M = 1.93, SD = 1.09) than the pseudo-profound
statements (M = 3.68, SD = 1.22), b = -1.74, SE = 0.09, p <
.001.
Confirmatory factor analyses. Using data from our
three studies, we also conducted confirmatory factor anal-
yses using the lavaan package (Oberski, 2014) to assess
whether the two bullshit receptivity scales should be treated
as two separate measures. For these analyses, we included
the ten scientific bullshit and the first ten pseudo-profound
bullshit statements. We compared two models: In the first
model, all items loaded onto one latent variable; in the sec-
ond model, items loaded onto two correlated latent variables
corresponding to pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity and
scientific bullshit receptivity. The fit of the two-variable
model (RMSEA = .043, CFI = .95) was significantly better
than the fit of the one-variable model (RMSEA = .085; CFI =
.81): j2(1) = 830.88, p < .001. The present analyses suggest
that the two measures of bullshit receptivity can indeed be
treated as separate measures.
Scientific bullshit sensitivity. We also tested whether
participants would be able to differentiate between the real
and bullshit scientific statements, with the expectation that
participants would see real statements as more truthful. In-
deed, participants accurately differentiated between the two
types of statements, believing that the real scientific state-
ments were more truthful (M = 3.01, SD = 0.68) than the
bullshit statements (M = 2.75, SD = 0.78), t(904) = 13.61, p
< .001. We also estimated a bullshit sensitivity score for par-
ticipants in Studies 1 and 2 (we did not include real scientific
statements in Study 3), where we estimated the difference
in truthfulness ratings between real scientific statements and
bullshit scientific statements. Here, higher scores indicate
that participants assigned greater truth to real (vs. bullshit)
scientific statements: M = 0.28, SD = 0.62.
Belief in science. Participants completed the 10-item Be-
lief in Science Scale (Farias et al., 2013). This scale mea-
sures the extent to which people believe in the superiority
of science and the extent to which people believe science is
an important and valuable social institution (Example: “Sci-
ence provides us with a better understanding of the universe
than does religion”). Participants rated the extent to which
they agreed or disagreed with statements on a 6-point Likert
scale (1 = strongly disagree; 6 = strongly agree), U = .93.
Social and economic conservatism. We used the Social
and Economic Conservatism Scale (Everett, 2013) to mea-
sure social (7-items; U = .88) and fiscal (5-items; U = .75)
conservatism. The items reflect a variety of political issues
(e.g., abortion, limited government, and welfare benefits).
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For each item, participants were asked to indicate the extent
to which they supported the issue on a scale from 0 (Strongly
against) to 100 (Strongly in favor).
Free market beliefs (Study 1). The Free Market Beliefs
Scale (Heath & Gifford, 2006) was used to measure sup-
port for the unregulated free-market system (Example: “The
preservation of the free market system is more important
than localized environmental concerns”). The scale consists
of six statements, which are rated by participants on a 5-point
Likert scale, based on how much they agree with them (1 =
strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree), U = .83.
Cognitive style (Study 2). Participants completed two
scales to measure cognitive style, the Need for Cognition
Scale (Cacioppo et al., 1984) and the Faith in Intuition Scale
(Epstein et al., 1996): The Need for Cognition Scale mea-
sures the extent to which people enjoy engaging in conscious
thinking (Example: “I prefer complex to simple problems”).
The scale consists of 19 statements that are rated on a 5-point
scale based on whether the statement is characteristic of the
participant (1 = Extremely uncharacteristic of me; 5 = Ex-
tremely characteristic of me), U = .96. The Faith in Intuition
Scale measures confidence in intuition and the tendency to
use it (Example: “I believe in trusting my hunches”). The
scale consists of twelve statements that are rated on a 5-point
scale (1 = completely false; 5 = completely true), U = .88.
Acquiescence bias (Study 2). We followed the method
of Rammstedt et al. (2013) to measure individual differ-
ences in acquiescence: Participants completed the Big Five
Inventory-10 (Rammstedt & John, 2007), which consists of
two-item measures for each of the Big Five traits. Partici-
pants were asked to rate to what extent they agreed that each
statement accurately described them (Example: “I see my-
self as someone who is reserved”). Ratings were made on a
scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree).
Note that for each two-item trait measure, there was one
item where agreement corresponded with a high trait score
and one item where agreement indicated a low score. To cal-
culate the degree of acquiescence, we summed the ten items
without reverse scoring the negative items. A high score on
this acquiescence measure indicates that a participant tends
to agree with items, regardless of the specific item content.
Science literacy (Study 3). To measure science literacy,
participants responded to seven true-false statements, such
as “The center of the Earth is very hot” (Kahan et al., 2012).
The final score for this measure is the number of correct
answers (out of seven).
2.2.2 Procedure
The survey was administered using Qualtrics. The proce-
dure for randomizing the different measures varied across
studies: In Studies 1 and 2, all participants were presented
with the two bullshit receptivity scales at the beginning of
the surveys, with these two scales presented in a randomized
order. In Study 1, the remaining scales were presented in a
fixed order (belief in science followed by political orientation
and free market beliefs). In Study 2, the remaining scales
were presented in a randomized order. Finally, in Study 3,
we manipulated whether the two bullshit receptivity scales
were presented at the beginning (or the end) of the survey;
order had no effect on our results. The remaining scales in
Study 3 were also presented in a randomized order (either
before or after the two bullshit scales). At the end of each
study, participants provided basic demographic information.
2.3 Analysis plan
We follow the analysis plan outlined in the pre-registration
for our third study: we test the correlates of the two types of
bullshit receptivity, and test whether these correlations differ
in strength for the two types of receptivity.4 For example, we
ask if the correlation between scientific bullshit receptivity
and belief in science is stronger than the correlation between
pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity and belief in science.
In addition to our pre-registered analyses, we also added
exploratory analyses looking at the correlates of scientific
bullshit sensitivity. Note that we use all available data for
each set of analyses, and that we indicate when our analyses
include variables that were measured in some, but not all, of
our studies.
3 Results
3.1 Correlates of scientific bullshit receptivity
To begin, we examined the correlations between the two
types of bullshit receptivity (pseudo-profound and scien-
tific), belief in science, the three measures of political ideol-
ogy (social conservatism, fiscal conservatism, and free mar-
ket beliefs), and the two measures of cognitive style (faith in
intuition and need for cognition). Then, we asked whether
these measures were differently correlated with the two mea-
sures of bullshit receptivity. For example, we asked whether
the correlation between belief in science and receptivity to
scientific bullshit was different from the correlation between
belief in science and receptivity to pseudo-profound bull-
shit. These correlation comparisons were conducted using
the cocor package (Diedenhofen & Musch, 2015) using the
4Our original analysis plan, as shown in our pre-registrations for the
first two studies, was to measure the correlations between the two types of
bullshit receptivity and potential correlates.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 15, No. 3, May 2020 Individual differences in receptivity to scientific bullshit 407
Table 2: Correlations between bullshit receptivity, belief in science, political ideology, and cognitive style.




































































Note: ∗ indicates p < .05; ∗∗ indicates p < .01; ∗∗∗ indicates p < .001. 95% confidence intervals are reported in brackets.
Column 6 is excluded because free market beliefs and the two cognitive styles were measured in different studies.
Figure 1: The correlates of receptivity to pseudo-profound



















Hittner, May and Silver (2003) method for comparing two
dependent correlations.
Analyses including the free market beliefs scale included
data from only Study 1 (N = 365), analyses including cog-
nitive style measures included data from only Study 2 (N
= 543), and the remaining analyses include data from all
three studies (N = 1,948). Table 2 includes a full correlation
table with descriptive statistics, and Figure 1 illustrates the
correlates of the two types of bullshit receptivity.
3.1.1 Pseudo-profound and scientific bullshit receptiv-
ity
To begin, we estimated the correlation between our two mea-
sures of bullshit receptivity: there was a significant positive
correlation, r(1,948) = .60, p < .001.
3.1.2 Belief in science and bullshit receptivity
Next, we looked at the relationships between belief in science
and the two types of bullshit receptivity: belief in science
was positively correlated with both pseudo-profound bullshit
receptivity (r = .07, p = .001) and scientific bullshit receptiv-
ity (r = .12, p < .001). We then used a Z-test to ask if these
two correlations were significantly different in magnitudes.
Indeed, the relationship between belief in science and scien-
tific bullshit receptivity was significantly stronger than the
relationship between belief in science and pseudo-profound
bullshit receptivity, Z = −2.24, p = .025.
3.1.3 Political ideology and bullshit receptivity
Next, we examined the relationship between conservative
political beliefs and bullshit receptivity. Replicating the re-
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Figure 2: Controlling for acquiescence did not substantially
change the correlates of bullshit receptivity.
Pseudo profound bullshit Scientific bullshit















sults of Sterling et al. (2016), we found that pseudo-profound
bullshit receptivity was again positively associated with so-
cial conservatism (r = .29, p < .001), economic conservatism
(r = .14, p < .001), and beliefs in the free-market (r = .20, p
< .001). At the same time, we found that scientific bullshit
receptivity was also positively correlated with social conser-
vatism (r = .18, p < .001) and economic conservatism (r =
.10, p < .001), though it was not significantly correlated with
free-market-beliefs (r = .04, p = .47).
Comparing these sets of correlations, we found that con-
servatism was more strongly associated with profound (vs.
scientific) bullshit receptivity: Social conservatism, Z =
5.43, p < .001; economic conservatism: Z = 2.09, p = .036;
Free-market-beliefs Z = 3.51, p < .001.
3.1.4 Bullshit receptivity and cognitive style
Following the approach we used in the preceding analyses,
we examined whether the two types of bullshit receptivity
correlated (differently) with individual differences in cogni-
tive style.
Faith in intuition was positively correlated with receptivity
to both types of bullshit. pseudo-profound bullshit: r = .38,
p < .001; scientific bullshit: r = .25, p < .001. Moreover,
the correlation between pseudo-profound bullshit and faith
in intuition was significantly stronger than the correlation
between scientific bullshit and faith in intuition: Z = 3.78,
p < .001. In contrast, individual differences in need for
cognition were not correlated with either type of bullshit
receptivity: pseudo-profound bullshit: r = -.04, p = .34;
scientific bullshit: r = -.05, p = .20; finally, there was no
significant difference between these two correlations, Z =
0.36, p < .71.
3.2 Bullshit receptivity and acquiescence bias
(Study 2)
Next, we asked to what extent the above results were related
to individual differences in acquiescence bias – the tendency
to agree with survey items regardless of content. These
analyses included participants from our second study, df
= 541. Acquiescence was positively correlated with both
receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit, r = .18, p < .001,
and receptivity to scientific bullshit, r = .16, p < .001. We
further examined whether acquiescence was correlated with
belief in science and political ideology. There was a positive
correlation between acquiescence and social conservatism, r
= .17, p < .001. However, acquiescence was not correlated
with either belief in science (r = .03, p = .42) or economic
conservatism (r = .07, p = .07). Regarding the correlations
between acquiescence and individual differences in cognitive
style, we found that acquiescence was positively correlated
with both faith in intuition (r = .26, p < .001) and need for
cognition (r = .30, p < .001).
Then, we used semi-partial correlations to test whether
our key results (i.e., the correlations between bullshit recep-
tivity, belief in science, and political ideology) were robust
when controlling for acquiescence bias (see Figure 2 and our
Appendix). Controlling for acquiescence did not change the
pattern of results.
3.3 Sensitivity to scientific bullshit (Studies 1
and 2)
We conducted a series of exploratory analyses comparing the
correlates of receptivity to scientific bullshit, receptivity to
scientific facts, and sensitivity to scientific bullshit (i.e., the
ability to differentiate between scientific facts and scientific
bullshit). Receptivity to scientific bullshit was positively
correlated with receptivity to scientific facts, r = .62, p <
.001, and negatively correlated with sensitivity to scientific
bullshit, r = −.49, p < .001. The correlates of the three
different measures are reported in Table 3.
There were notable differences between the correlates of
receptivity to scientific bullshit and sensitivity to scientific
bullshit. Scientific bullshit sensitivity was negatively corre-
lated with receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit, conser-
vative political beliefs (social conservatism and free market
beliefs), and reliance on intuitive cognitive processes. At the
same time, sensitivity to bullshit was positively correlated
with belief in science and reliance on analytical thinking
(i.e., need for cognition).
3.4 Bullshit receptivity and science literacy
(Study 3)
To conclude, we examined whether scientific literacy mod-
erated the relationship between the two types of bullshit
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Table 3: Correlates of receptivity to scientific bullshit, receptivity to scientific facts, and scientific bullshit sensitivity.
Variable Scientific bullshit Scientific facts Bullshit sensitivity (facts−bullshit)
Pseudo-profound bullshit .59∗∗∗ [.57, .63] .34∗∗∗ [.28, .40] −.29∗∗∗ [−.35, −.23]
Belief in science .12∗∗∗ [.07, .16] .15∗∗∗ [.08, 20] .07∗ [.004, .13]
Social conservatism .18∗∗∗ [.14, .23] .04 [−.02, .04] −.13∗∗ [−.19, −.13]
Economic conservatism .10∗∗∗ [.05, .14] .01 [−.05, .01] −.05 [−.12, .009]
Free market beliefs (Study 1) .04 [−.06, .14] −.11∗ [−.21, −.01] −.17∗∗∗ [−.27, −.07]
Faith in intuition (Study 2) .25∗∗∗ [.17, .33] .16∗∗∗ [.08, .24] −.12∗∗ [−.20, −.04]
Need for cognition (Study 2) −.05 [−.13, .03] .05 [−.03, .14] .12∗∗ [.04, .21]
Note: ∗ indicates p < .05; ∗∗ indicates p < .01; ∗∗∗ indicates p < .001. 95% confidence intervals are reported in brackets.
Figure 3: The correlation between pseudo-profound bullshit
receptivity and scientific bullshit receptivity is moderated by
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receptivity. We hypothesized that the correlation between
the two types of bullshit would be weaker for scientifically
literate individuals (i.e., those with better abilities to dis-
cern scientific facts from scientific bullshit). To test this
hypothesis, we estimated a multiple regression with sci-
entific bullshit receptivity as the dependent variable. The
following variables were entered as (standardized) predic-
tors: pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity, scientific liter-
acy, and a pseudo-profound bullshit-by-scientific literacy in-
teraction term. Scientific bullshit was positively associated
with pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity (V = .60, p < .001)
and there was no relationship between literacy and scientific
bullshit (V = −.04, p = .12); critically, there was also a sig-
nificant interaction (V = −.06, p = .008). Figure 3 illustrates
the pattern of the interaction. The relationship between the
two types of bullshit receptivity was stronger (weaker) for
individuals low (high) in scientific literacy.
4 Discussion
We introduced a scale to measure individual differences
in receptivity to scientific bullshit (nonsensical, scientific-
sounding statements). First, we examined the relationship
between receptivity to scientific bullshit and receptivity to
pseudo-profound bullshit. Going into this project, we orig-
inally expected that these two measures would be uncorre-
lated, or negatively correlated. Contrary to our expectations,
we observed a strong positive correlation between the two
types of bullshit receptivity. This finding is important, as it
supports the idea that individual differences in bullshit re-
ceptivity may generalize across content domains (Čavojová
et al., 2020).
Second, we examined the correlates of receptivity to scien-
tific bullshit. We found that receptivity to scientific bullshit
was positively correlated with belief in science and nega-
tively correlated with conservative political beliefs (espe-
cially social conservatism) and reliance on intuitive cogni-
tive processes. The correlates of pseudo-profound bullshit
receptivity followed a similar pattern (in terms of direction),
but they also differed in terms of strength. Receptivity to
scientific (vs. pseudo-profound) bullshit was more strongly
correlated with belief in science, and less strongly corre-
lated with conservatism political beliefs and faith in intu-
ition. These results suggest that although there is a general
proclivity to accept bullshit statements (e.g., individuals with
conservative beliefs are more likely to accept bullshit state-
ments, regardless of context), the correlations of bullshit
receptivity differ significantly across domains. For exam-
ple, political conservatives may be particularly receptive to
pseudo-profound bullshit, whereas those who believe in sci-
ence may be particularly receptive to scientific bullshit.
To test the robustness of the above results, we also con-
ducted analyses controlling for acquiescence bias, the overall
tendency to agree with survey items, regardless of content.
Acquiescence was positively correlated with both types of
bullshit receptivity; however, controlling for acquiescence
did not substantially change the extent to which either of our
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bullshit measures were correlated with belief in science, ide-
ology, or cognitive style measures. We also compared recep-
tivity and sensitivity to scientific bullshit statements. We ob-
served that sensitivity to scientific bullshit, the ability to dif-
ferentiate between factual and bullshit scientific statements,
was positively correlated with belief in science, negatively
correlated with conservative political beliefs, negatively cor-
related with intuitive thinking, and positively correlated with
analytical thinking. Note that these results are in line with
previous studies that analyzed sensitivity to profound bull-
shit, which found that sensitivity to profound bullshit was
negatively correlated with reliance on heuristics and biases,
and positively correlated with analytical thinking (Penny-
cook et al., 2015).
Finally, we examined how content knowledge (science lit-
eracy) influences sensitivity to different types of bullshit. We
found that the correlation between the two types of bullshit
receptivity was moderated by scientific literacy: the cor-
relation between pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity and
scientific bullshit receptivity was stronger (weaker) for indi-
viduals scoring low (high) in science literacy.
4.1 Political ideology and bullshit receptivity
Previous studies found that individuals with conservative
political beliefs are more receptive to pseudo-profound bull-
shit (Pfattheicher & Schindler, 2016; Sterling et al., 2016).
Our studies successfully replicated and extended this find-
ing. Political conservatives (especially social conservatives)
were consistently more receptive to pseudo-profound bull-
shit. Surprisingly, conservatives were also more receptive
to scientific bullshit. This positive correlation is particularly
striking, given the consistent negative correlations between
conservative ideology and belief in science (r’s < −.23). In
other words: political conservatives do not trust science, but
they are still more receptive to scientific bullshit. Critically
though, the correlation between ideology and scientific bull-
shit receptivity was significantly smaller than the correlation
between ideology and pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity.
This difference in correlations suggests that conservatives’
general mistrust of science only partially inoculates them
from the allure of scientific bullshit.
4.2 Limitations
It is important to note that scientific bullshit receptivity is
weakly correlated with some of our measures of interest, with
many correlations falling between .10 and .20. These effect
sizes are generally consistent with the results of other studies
examining the correlates of bullshit receptivity (Čavojová
et al., 2020; Nilsson et al., 2019). It remains to be seen
whether scientific bullshit receptivity meaningfully predicts
behavioral outcomes, such as individual differences in the
effectiveness of science-based advertisements, or the will-
ingness to follow the advice of scientists.
There are also potential issues with the items we used in
our studies: In Studies 1 and 2, participants were presented
with real and fake scientific statements; however, partici-
pants may have lacked the expertise to clearly differentiate
between the two types of statements. In other words, the real
scientific statements may have been too difficult for partic-
ipants to properly evaluate. However, note that the average
truthfulness ratings of our real scientific statements (M =
3.01, SD = 0.68) was quite similar to the profoundness rat-
ings of the motivational (the non-bullshit) statements used
in Pennycook et al. (2015), Study 3: M = 3.05, SD = 0.69;
Study 4 M = 3.13, SD = 0.67. Moreover, the analyses we
conducted using scientific bullshit sensitivity also produced
results similar to prior analyses of the correlates of pseudo-
profound bullshit sensitivity. Specifically, we found that
sensitivity was positively correlated with analytical thinking
(need for cognition) and negatively correlated with faith in
intuition. Taken together, these pieces of evidence suggest
that our measure of sensitivity worked as intended, despite
the difficulty of our true scientific statements.
Finally, our measure of scientific bullshit receptivity fo-
cused on physical science, rather than specific scientific is-
sues. Consider the correlation between conservative political
ideology and acceptance of scientific bullshit. This correla-
tion is likely to change depending on the specific context in
which scientific bullshit appears. While there are some gen-
eral effects of ideology on trust in science (Gauchat, 2012),
individual attitudes towards science and scientists are also
heavily shaped by the extent to which science hinders or
supports personal goals (Farias et al., 2013; Kahan et al.,
2012). In other words, general attitudes towards science do
not necessarily correspond to attitudes towards specific sci-
entific issues (e.g., global warming, or genetically modified
organisms). Both liberals and conservatives are reluctant to
accept dissonant science. Similarly, we expect that liberals
and conservatives would be less willing to accept dissonant
scientific bullshit.
4.3 Conclusion
Scientific knowledge can help individuals and organizations
make better, evidence-based decisions. At the same time,
irrelevant scientific jargon can be used to mislead or harm
the public. We introduced a measure of scientific bullshit
receptivity, the tendency to believe in nonsensical scientific
statements. Scientific bullshit receptivity was strongly cor-
related with pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity, suggesting
the existence of a domain-general tendency to accept bull-
shit. At the same time, the two types of bullshit differed
in terms of how strongly they were associated with other
individual difference measures, and we found that scientific
literacy moderated the relationship between the two types
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of bullshit receptivity. Our results are an important step
towards broadening the concept of bullshit receptivity.
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Appendix
Bullshit receptivity and acquiescence bias
(Study 2)
In our second study, We examined how controlling for acqui-
escence bias changes the correlations between the two types
of bullshit receptivity and the following variables: belief
in science, political ideology (social conservatism and eco-
nomic conservatism), and cognitive style (faith in intuition
and need for cognition).
We used the following procedure to estimate semi-partial
correlations controlling for acquiescence: First, we re-
gressed the two types of bullshit receptivity on acquiescence
and saved the model residuals. Next, we tested the corre-
lations between these model residuals and the variables of
interest (e.g., belief in science, etc.). Finally, we used the
Hittner et al. (2003) method to compare the zero-order and
semi-partial versions of each correlation. The results of this
procedure are reported in Table A1. Controlling for acqui-
escence significantly reduced the extent to which the two
types of bullshit receptivity were correlated with social con-
servatism and faith in intuition, and significantly increased
the extent to which both types of bullshit receptivity were
correlated with need for cognition (i.e., the correlations be-
came more negative). Importantly, although controlling for
acquiescence altered the strengths of these correlations, this
did not substantially change our pattern of results.
